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Introduction [1]
The last decades are in the sign of the growth of the interest in problems 
of the privacy protection, especially in connection with the development of 
the  modern  information  and  communication  technologies.  This  interest 
rises from the academic discourse community and gradually, it spread into 
politics and acquired the form of the law. These debates started in the 1960s 
in the USA.1 
Nowadays,  the  privacy  protection  is  subordinated  under  the  term 
“autonomy”.  The  privacy  refers  to  an  individual’s  right  to  conduct  his 
affairs without being compelled to reveal information he doesn’t want to 
reveal.  Even thought we accept the dictum of the indivisibility of human 
rights,  it  is  necessary  to  state  that  privacy  and personal  data  protection 
doesn’t fall within the untouchable rights that invoke absolute obligations 
of states.2 The justification for the limitation of the right which is related to 
the  protection  of  the  personal  integrity  has  to  be  based  on  especially 
relevant reasons and requirements.
Recently, there is an enormous amount of effort devoted to the increase of 
police and security services´ “not sufficient” powers. This political pressure 
is invoked in the name of national and international security. Nevertheless, 
there  are  as  well  positive  economic  incentives  against  the  personal  data 
protection.
1 Westin, A.F.  (1970):  Privacy and Freedom. New York,  Atheneum. Miller,  A.  (1971):  The 
Assault  on  Privacy:  Computers,  Data  Banks  and  Dossiers.  Ann  Arbor,  University  of 
Michigan Press.
2 Sudre, F. (1997): Mezinárodní a evropské právo lidských práv. Brno, MU Brno-EIS UK, p. 133 
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The Security Realm [2]
“Essential Liberty” and “Temporary Safety” [2.1]
The personal data protection invokes suspicions, because it points to the 
anonymity which facilitates many forms of crime. We have to incorporate 
the  Philippics  of  James  Otis  against  writs  of  assistance  –  despite  he 
considered  himself  a  loyal  British  citizen  –  in  the  context  of  the 
development preceding the American War of Independence. A Benjamin 
Franklin’s famous quote, “Those who would give up Essential Liberty, to 
purchase a little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety”, can 
be  opposed  (but  not  invalidated)  from  the  perspective  of  the  growing 
availability of modern destructive technologies. The phenomenon known as 
“group polarization” is catalyzed by the cyber technology developments.3 
We can find the logics in that argumentation, but almost every human right 
violation  is  legitimized  by  lofty  ideals.  Nevertheless,  this  argumentation 
often falls on fertile ground amongst certain parts of the electorate. 
In the European Union, these tendencies are represented by the creation of 
the databases oriented on the information exploitable for security purposes 
and the enlargement  of the existing databases  to include biometric  data. A 
sui generis problem involves the blanket retention of communications data. 
The Biometric Data Processing [2.2]
Nowadays, in the EU, there is the Schengen Information System which 
works  by  holding  a  number  of  specific  alerts  on  people,  vehicles  and 
property.  The SIS (existing from 1995) is a secure governmental database 
system used for the purpose of maintaining and distributing information 
related to border security and law enforcement. The SIS is composed of a 
central  database  called  “the  Central  Schengen  Information  System” (CS-
SIS),  access  points  defined  by  each  Member  State  (NI-SIS)  and  a 
communication infrastructure. The effective execution of the control of 15 
million items in the SIS is made more difficult by the fact that there is a high 
number of the mentioned access points.4
3 Einstein, C. (2002): “The Law of Group Polarization”. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 
No. 2, pp. 175-195
4 Second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). Retrieved November 14, 2006, from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/shotlist_pa ge/20061023SHL12011/default_en.htm. 
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Complementary  information can be exchanged via  the  Sirene  bureaux. 
Sirene  is  the  French  acronym for  “Computer  System for  the  Register  of 
Enterprises and their Local Units.” Sirene is viewed as a threat to the rights 
of the individual. Sirene is not de jure part of the Schengen convention, but 
was  established  by  the  Schengen  Executive  Committee  and for  example 
Pikna rates Sirene to be the third component of the SIS and he infers that 
this system was established on the basis of Article 108 of the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement.5 
The Schengen Information System II (SIS II) is at the stage of preparation. 
The start of the SIS II is scheduled for March 2007 but the last course of 
events  indicates  that  this  deadline  won’t  be  kept.  This  system  includes 
innovations dangerous to the personal data protection. New SIS II will store 
photos and biometric data (e.g. digital portraits and fingerprints) among all 
members and will answer police queries within 5 seconds.
Council regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the 
establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention plays an important role in the asylum 
politics.  A  central  unit  of  the  Eurodac  is  managed  by  the  European 
Commission. Visa Information System will store the biometric data too. 
The Europol Convention states that Europol shall establish and maintain a 
computerised system to allow the input, access and analysis of data. The 
Europol  Computer  System  (TECS)  has  three  principal  components:  an 
information system (EIS - Europol Information System), an analysis system 
(AWF  -  Analytical  Work  Files),  and  an  index  system  (IIS  -  Interim 
Information System). 
The information system may be used to store,  modify and utilise only 
such data as are necessary for the performance of Europol’s tasks. The data 
concern  persons  who,  under  the  national  law  of  a  Member  State,  are 
suspected of having committed or having taken part in a criminal offence 
for which Europol  is  competent  or who have been convicted of  such an 
offence. The system also contains data concerning persons where there are 
serious  grounds  under  national  law  for  believing  will  commit  criminal 
5 Pikna, B. (2003): Evropská unie - vnitřní a vnější bezpečnost a ochrana základních práv. 
Praha, Linde, pp. 251-252
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offences  for  which  Europol  is  competent.  Europol  collects,  stores  and 
manipulates data in analytical  work files for  the purposes of developing 
intelligence to guide law enforcement investigations.
It this matter, we stand on opinion that the weakness of the personal data 
protection  is  the  width  of  the  administrative  discretion  limited  by 
formulations  as,  for  example “the data necessary for  the performance of 
Europol's  tasks”,  “the  protection  of  security  and  public  order”  or 
“protection  of  the  rights  of  individuals”.  Such  wide  discretion  is 
questionable without the sufficient and effective justice control. 
The Blanket Retention of Communications Data [2.3]
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
entered into force on 3rd May 2006.
Member States shall ensure that the specified data (data necessary to trace 
and identify the source,  destination, date, time and duration, and type of a 
communication, data necessary to identify users´ communication equipment 
or  what  purports  to  be  their  equipment  and  the  location  of  mobile 
communication  equipment)  are  retained  for  periods  of  not  less  than  six 
months and not more than two years from the date  of the communication.
Pursuant  to  Article  15(3)  of  the  Directive,  the  Czech  Republic  hereby 
declared that it was postponing application of this Directive to the retention 
of communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and 
Internet e-mail until 36 months after the date of adoption thereof.
Although, no data revealing the content of the communication may be 
retained pursuant to this Directive. There is an open question, whether the 
stored data represents an integral and indivisible part of the communication 
which merits the protection of article 8(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Critics of the directive could refer to the judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 2 August 1984 in the case of Malone 
against the United Kingdom.6 
6 Malone v. the United Kingdom – 8691/79 [1984] ECHR 10 (2 August 1984).
-202-
D. Novák: Constitutional Aspects of Topical Risks to Personal Data Protection
Further objections could be raised in connection with the proportionality 
test. We presume that only 0,2 percent of this data will be demanded by the 
police. About 90 percent of the data will be requested during the first month 
after the creation of an information.7 The remaining 99,98 percent  of the 
data would be stored useless and with the risk of the misuse during a 5-23 
months period. 
We  can  argue  in  the  defence  of  this  suspicious  approach  that  the 
consequences of the realization of the corresponding criminal and terrorist 
threats are extreme too. 
This criticized directive refers to Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. Ireland submits that the choice of Article 95 TEC as 
the  legal  basis  for  the  Directive  is  fundamentally  flawed.  The  Irish 
government has filed its case in the European Court of Justice on 6 July 2006 
(Case C-301/06).
Since  5  March  2003  airline  companies  operating  in  Europe  found 
themselves caught in a dilemma where on the one hand they are obliged to 
observe  the  EU  legislation  on  data  protection  (principally  Directive 
95/46/EC) while on the other hand US legislation obliges them to allow the 
US  Customs  and  Border  Protection  to  have  unrestricted  access  to  the 
personal data of passengers travelling to or via the USA. 
The European Parliament brought on 27 July 2004 the actions against the 
Council of the European Union (Case C-317/04) and the Commission of the 
European Communities (Case C-318/04). The European Parliament claimed 
that the Court should annul Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 
annul under Article 230 EC Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 
2004. The European Parliament emphasized the principle of proportionality, 
the requirement to state reasons and the principle of cooperation in good 
faith.
In case C-318/04 the Court  agreed that  the decision was adopted ultra 
vires.  The  Commission’s  decision  did  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the 
Directive. In case C-317/04 the Court agreed that Article 95 EC could not be 
used as legal basis for adopting the Decision. Therefore, the Court could not 
7 Invasive, Illusory, Illegal, and Illegitimate: Privacy International and EDRi Response to the 
Consultation on a Framework Decision on Data Retention. Retrieved November 14, 2006, 
from http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/responsetoretention.html.
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clarified the human rights aspects of these criticized acts. In the theory of 
international and European law, the EU Law which was enacted ultra vires 
would not be binding in Member states. The ECJ judgment is not necessary. 
We think such a scenario is not realistic in the practice.
The Economic Realm [3]
The Crucial argument for the liberalisation as well as for the regulation is 
the impact on the economic situation of data subjects. In a fully deregulated 
system, the holders of genetic information will assess who will pay lower 
mortgage rates, lower credit card rates, lower college loan rates, lower car 
payment rates and who will lose access to the health insurance.
The European conception of the personal data protection which is derived 
from the  personal  integrity associates  the  idea of  intransmittable  human 
rights.  However,  intransmissibility  doesn’t  correspond  with  practical 
requirements of economic activities.  Although the opinions of Advocates 
General of the European Court of Justice are enthralled by the radicalism, 
herein  an  other  point  of  view  is  preferred.  In  concrete  terms,  Antonio 
Tizzano handed down an opinion arguing the absence of the connection 
with the Single Market.8
In  the  USA,  critics  of  informational  privacy  laws  often  raise  the  First 
Amendment argument. Their argument is that the guarantee of free speech 
in the First Amendment is an explicit constitutional right and is a superior 
right  to  an  implicit  constitutional  right  to  privacy,  and  any  legislative 
information privacy rights granted to individuals.9
The Personal data protection doesn’t come out victoriously in the conflicts 
with the protection of the property in the Czech legal literature.10 
We can admit that the reasons for the harmonization of the personal data 
privacy laws was notably pragmatic. Germany was reluctant to accept any 
measure reducing the high level  of protection afforded its citizens in the 
Single market. This connection with the economic system and the commerce 
8 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren 
Jönköping and in case C-465/00 Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk.
9 Charlesworth, A. (2000): Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy Regulation. 
European Public Law. No. 2, p. 261 
10 Bejček, J. (2003): Muže být účelem zákona samoúčel? Právní rozhledy. No. 11, p. 539
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gives  reasons  for  the  subordination  of  personal  data  protection  to  the 
property protection regime. Likewise the domain names. 
The reinterpretation of terms with the impacts on the human rights is not 
exceptional. For example in the Czech law, there was a redefinition of the 
concept of the things realised by the Act No. 370/2000.11
This reinterpretation could increase the vigilance of data subjects to the 
consideration (quid pro quo).
We  stand  on  opinion  that  this  conception  is  compatible  with 
administrative interferences in the personal data protection. 
The abundance of relatively uncertain terms reduces the effectiveness of the 
regulation. This problem can be demonstrated by the category of the sensitive 
personal  data.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  the  security  camera  monitoring  is 
conditional  on  the  notice  in  the  monitored  room.12 For  sensitive  data,  the 
explicit consent of data subjects must be obtained. Is the face of an individual, 
revealing ethnic identity, to be treated as sensitive data? The same question 
applies  to  other  biometric  data.  Voice  recordings,  iris  scanning  or  even 
fingerprints may reveal race or health status. We can object that the purpose 
of  the  data  processing  is  different.  But  the  substantial  identity  of  the 
information  could  not  be  disguised  in  spite  of  a  different  context.  The 
complexity  of  the  problem increases  in  virtue  of  the  combination and  the 
typification  of  the  personal  data.  The  foreseeability  of  the  law  was  not 
reinforced by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case Kühne & 
Heitz  (C-453/00),  and  in  particular  by  the  judgment  in  case  Kapferer  (C-
234/04), which is not unequivocal and requires careful interpretation.13
Conclusion [4]
Each free society has to protect, by force, the rights of some individuals to 
oppose  that  force.  It  is  the  paradox  of  a  free  society.  Our  technological 
progress is on the verge of giving ordinary citizens the destructive means 
11 Pelikánová, I. (2001): Problém převodu a přechodu práv, Právní rozhledy. No. 4, p. 143
12 Stanovisko  ÚOOÚ  č.  1/2006:  Provozování  kamerového  systému  z  hlediska  zákona  o 
ochraně  osobních  údajů.  Retrieved  November  14,  2006,  from  http://www.uoou.cz/
stanovisko_2006_1.pdf .
13 C-453/00 Judgement of 13/01/2004, Kühne & Heitz (Rec. 2004, p. I-837), C-234/04 Judgement 
of 16/03/2006, Kapferer (Rec. 2006, p. I-2585).
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comparable with weapons of mass destruction held by Great Powers in the 
Nuclear Age.  These tendencies (multiplied by the cyber  technologies) can 
legitimize a radical extension of powers to police and security services. 
Nevertheless,  that  objections  aren’t  able  to  refute  the  necessity  of  the 
effective personal data protection.
Numerous references to the proportionality principle in the personal data 
protection  law  are  related  to  the  necessity  of  the  stabilization  of  the 
regulation and its independence from technological evolutions. There is no 
possibility  for  the  successful  standardization  of  concrete  situations.  This 
conception  takes  its  inspiration  from  the  constitutional  law.  Differences 
between the argumentation by principles in constitutional law and the so-
called “simple” law have its importance. Our contemporary practice doesn’t 
provide  an  empirical  basis  for  the  conclusion  about  differences.  In 
according  with  the  Forsthoff’s  thesis  they  will  be  in  quantitative  (not 
qualitative) terms.
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